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1 Introduction 
Around the world, ongoing demographic change puts tremendous stress on traditional 
social security systems, and individuals are increasingly asked to assume responsibility for their 
financial wellbeing in retirement. Consequently, they face the challenge of building up and 
maintaining an adequate portfolio of financial assets that ensures satisfying future consumption 
liabilities, while controlling the risks that individuals face in retirement. Against this 
background, this paper derives optimal consumption and portfolio choice patterns for a retired 
individual that has access to stocks, bonds, and participating life annuities (PLAs), while being 
exposed to capital market risks on the stock and bond markets as well as to idiosyncratic and 
systematic longevity risks.  
Participating contracts are the typical product offered in the German life and annuity 
market (Bohnert/Gatzert, 2012; Berdin/Gründl, 2014), and they are also among the most 
prevalent insurance products around the world (Grosen/Jørgensen, 2000). As described in 
Maurer et al. (2013a), among others, participating life annuities provide guaranteed lifelong 
minimum annuity benefits in combination with participation in the insurer’s surpluses. 
Minimum benefits are calculated based on conservative assumptions regarding capital market 
and mortality developments, while surpluses distributed to annuitants bridge the gap between 
the insurer’s actual investment and mortality experiences and the projections used in pricing. 
Through the participation scheme, systematic longevity risk is shared between the insurer and 
the annuitants, as unanticipated longevity shocks result in benefit adjustments via the surplus 
mechanism. 
The literature on participating life insurance contracts is extensive.1 Most studies 
concentrate on actuarial risk analysis for and financial pricing of the guarantees embedded in 
these products (e.g. Briys/de Varenne, 1997; Grosen/Jørgensen, 2000, 2002; Ballotta, 2005; 
Barbarin/Devolder, 2005; Bauer et al., 2006; Gatzert/Kling, 2007; Kling et al. 2007; 
Zaglauer/Bauer, 2008). Others study the value of such contracts for the consumer (e.g. Gatzert 
et al., 2009, 2012; Maurer et al., 2013a). Yet to the best of our knowledge, optimal demand for 
PLAs within a lifecycle framework has not been studied as of now. While several studies 
integrate insurance products into a lifecycle portfolio choice model (e.g. Huang/Milevsky, 
2008; Horneff et al., 2008, 2008a; Inkmann et al., 2011; Inkmann/Michaelides, 2012; Hubener 
et al., 2014), those papers that analyze non-fixed annuity products typically concentrate on unit-
linked, variable annuities that do not include guarantees (e.g. Milevsky/Young, 2007; Horneff 
et al. 2009, 2010). An exception is the paper by Horneff et al. (2013a) that incorporates variable 
annuity products that provide both upside potential and downside protection. These guarantees, 
however, only cover the capital market development, as that paper does not account for 
variation in mortality rates. Hence, there is neither participation in the mortality performance 
nor a need for protection against adverse mortality developments. Maurer et al. (2013) studies 
annuities that provide participation in both capital market as well as mortality developments, 
but those products do not provide any guarantees. 
The present paper contributes to the existing literature by analyzing optimal demand 
patterns for participating annuity contracts providing minimum income guarantees within a 
lifecycle consumption and portfolio choice framework that incorporates idiosyncratic and 
systematic mortality risk as well as investment risks in the stock and bond markets. We show 
that the retiree draws substantial utility from access to PLAs, equivalent to 20% of initial wealth 
in the presence of systematic longevity risk. We also find that stochasticity in mortality rates 
1 For a comprehensive overview of the literature on participating contracts see, for example, Jørgensen (2004), 
Bohnert/Gatzert (2012), Eling/Holder (2013). 
                                                          
only has a minor impact on the appeal of PLAs to the retiree. Even if the interest rate guarantee 
is reduced to zero in adverse capital market environments, PLAs prove to provide substantial 
utility for retirees. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our lifecycle and 
mortality model as well as the mechanics of our PLA product. In Section 3 we derive optimal 
portfolio choice and annuitization patterns with and without systematic mortality risk. 
Moreover, we study the impact of adverse capital market development and conduct a welfare 
analysis. A final section concludes. 
2 Model 
2.1 Lifecycle Framework 
We model the lifecycle of a retired male from age 65 to 100, building on and extending 
the setup described in Horneff et al. (2013). At the beginning of each year, the retiree receives 
an exogenous pension income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡, e.g. from Social Security or an occupational pension plan. 
The sum of this pension income and any pre-existing liquid wealth 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 represents the retiree’s 
cash on hand 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡, which is allocated to (nominal) consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, stock investments 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, bond 
investments 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡, and the purchase of PLAs 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 . (1) 
At the end of each year, the retiree receives the returns on his stock and bond 
investments and, subject to having purchased any PLAs, an additional (nominal) annuity 
income 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡. Consequently, liquid wealth at the beginning of the next period is given by 
 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 +  𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 + 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , (2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 represents the log-normally distributed, risky nominal return on stocks and (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵 − 1) 
is the normally distributed, risky nominal yield on bonds.2 Consumption and investment 
decisions are made such that the retiree maximizes his expected utility, described by a recursive, 
additively time-separable CRRA utility function: 
 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = (𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡)1−𝜌𝜌1 − 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ⋅ 𝛽𝛽 ⋅ 𝜋𝜋𝜌𝜌−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡[𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1], (3) 
with terminal utility 
 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 = (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇)1−𝜌𝜌1 − 𝜌𝜌  (4) 
and subject to the constraints  
 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 > 0;   𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ,𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0. (5) 
Here, 𝜌𝜌 is the retiree’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝛽𝛽 his time preference, and 𝑇𝑇 
is the maximum age 100. 𝜋𝜋 represents the annual increase in consumer prices, through which 
the individual accounts for inflation in his optimization exercise. Finally, 𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 is the retiree’s 
subjective survival probability from 𝑡𝑡 to 𝑡𝑡 + 1, which is known at time 𝑡𝑡 but -over time- evolves 
according to the stochastic dynamics described in Section 2.2 below.  
2.2 Mortality Dynamics 
For modeling the stochastic dynamics of the retiree’s subjective survival probabilities, we 
rely on the parsimonious model of Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (Cairns et al., 2006). They assume 
that the logits of the conditional one-year mortality rates 𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡  at time 𝑡𝑡 for an individual age 𝑥𝑥 
can be described as:  
2 With respect to fixed-income investments, a typical approach in the literature on portfolio choice with annuities 
is to assume that bonds earn a constant real rate of return. Here, we allow for stochastic variation in fixed-income 
returns as these fluctuations play a major role in the surplus mechanism of the PLA. We focus on the long-term 
government bond yield and not on the return of a diversified bond portfolio, as the guaranteed interest rate, a 
central parameter in the PLA mechanics, is directly tied to the long-term yield. Moreover, we work under the 
simplifying assumption of normally distributed yields, as the standard approach of incorporating autoregressive 
yields or even a fully-fledged term structure model is computationally infeasible due to the curse of dimensionality. 
                                                          
 logit(𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡) = log � 𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡1 − 𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡� = 𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴2,𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑥𝑥. (6) 
The stochastic dynamics of 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = �𝐴𝐴1,𝑡𝑡,𝐴𝐴2,𝑡𝑡�𝑇𝑇 are described by a two-dimensional 
random walk with drift: 
 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴 + 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡+1, (7) 
with 𝜇𝜇𝐴𝐴 representing the drift of 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 and 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 the lower triangular matrix resulting from a Cholesky 
decomposition of the covariance Σ𝐴𝐴 of 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡. 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡+1is a bi-variate standard normal shock. 
2.3 PLA Mechanics 
The individual has access to participating life annuities over his retirement period and can 
annuitize gradually as he sees fit. When adding to his stock of PLAs, the retiree trades a 
nonrefundable premium 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 for guaranteed lifelong annuity income 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  plus non-guaranteed, 
stochastic surplus payments 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (see e.g. Maurer et al., 2013a). The additional guaranteed 
income is given by: 
 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡(1 + 𝛿𝛿) ⋅ 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥   , (8) 
with the resulting total guaranteed lifelong annuity income 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡 + 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (𝐿𝐿�0 = 0). 𝛿𝛿 is 
an expense loading factor charged to cover the insurer’s costs of operation. 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 is the price at 
age 𝑥𝑥 of a fixed annuity paying 1 currency unit for life at the end of each year. Following the 
actuarial principle of equivalence, this price is calculated as: 
 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼(1 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃)𝑡𝑡 .𝑇𝑇
𝑡𝑡=1
 (9) 
Here, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 is the guaranteed interest rate promised by the insurer. 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼 =
∏ (1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥+𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 )𝑡𝑡−1𝑖𝑖=0  is the 𝑡𝑡-period survival probability for an individual aged 𝑥𝑥, where 𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥+𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼  
represents the insurer’s first-order actuarial assumptions regarding the conditional 1-period 
mortality rates in the insured collective.  
The non-guaranteed surplus payments depend on the insurer’s actual experience 
regarding mortality and capital market returns vis-à-vis the first-order assumptions used in 
pricing the PLA. Following Wolfsdorf (1997) and Maurer et al. (2013a), the insurer’s total 
surplus from mortality experience can be calculated as: 
with actuarial reserve at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 (after PLA payments) 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1 and observed mortality 𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥+𝑡𝑡. 
These mortality rates evolve stochastically as described in Section 2.2. The insurer’s total 
surplus from capital market experience can be calculated as: 
with 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 the actuarial reserve at time 𝑡𝑡 (prior to additional PLA purchases), and ?̃?𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 the 
stochastic investment return on the assets backing the insurer’s reserves.3 The development of 
the actuarial reserve over time is governed by: 
with 𝑉𝑉0 = 0. 
Total surpluses generated from mortality experience (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡+1𝑞𝑞 ) and investment performance 
(𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡+1𝑟𝑟 ) are shared between the insurer and the annuitants. In this regard, German regulation 
requires that negative surpluses are solely borne by the insurer and that surpluses from the two 
3 Insurers’ assets can be invested into a mixed portfolio, primarily consisting of bonds with a limited exposure to 
equities. German insurance regulation allows for a maximum of 35% of equity in insurer portfolios (see, among 
others, Maurer et al., 2013). 
 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡+1𝑞𝑞 = (𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡+1) ⋅ (𝑞𝑞�𝑥𝑥+𝑡𝑡  −  𝑞𝑞𝑥𝑥+𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 ),   (10) 
 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡+1𝑟𝑟 = �𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛿𝛿� ⋅ (?̃?𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 −  𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃), (11) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1 = 1𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥+𝑡𝑡 ⋅ �𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡1 + 𝛿𝛿� ⋅ (1 + 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃)− 𝐿𝐿�𝑡𝑡+1,  (12) 
                                                          
sources must not be netted, should one be negative and one positive. Consequently, the amount 
of surplus attributed to the annuitant is given by: 
with 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞(𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟) representing the annuitant’s share of mortality (investment) surplus.  
2.4 Calibration and Solution 
Drawing on standard parameterizations in the lifecycle literature, we assume a risk 
aversion coefficient of 𝜌𝜌 = 5, and a time preference parameter of 𝛽𝛽 = 0.96 (see, e.g, Horneff 
et al., 2013). In our baseline scenario, we calibrate the capital market model to historical 
German data for the period 1980 through 2012. For stocks, we rely on the MSCI Germany total 
return index. Bond returns are based on the average annual yields on German government bonds 
with maturities between 9 and 10 years, as provided by the Bundesbank. Inflation rates are 
calculated using the German CPI provided by Datastream. Based on those time series, the log-
returns of stocks have a mean of 8.89% and a volatility of 25.3%, while the bond yield has a 
mean of 5.91% and a volatility of 2.10%.4 The correlation between the log-returns of stocks 
and the bond yields is 0.0004. To reduce computational burden, we assume that annual inflation 
is constant at 2.2%, which is equal to the average inflation rate over the calibration period and 
slightly above the long-term inflation target of the European Central Bank (2%).  
Subsequently, we will analyze a more unfavorable capital market scenario, which is in 
line with more recent developments. To this end, we calibrate our model using the same data, 
but we restrict the sample to the period 2000 through 2012. Hence, we include both the dot-
com crisis of the early 2000s as well as the financial crisis of 2008. Here, the log-returns of 
stocks have a mean of 0.7% and a volatility of 30.0%, while the bond yield has a mean of 3.86% 
4 This calibration results in a small but non-zero probability for negative bond yields. In our simulation analyses 
we account for this by setting negative yield draws to zero. 
 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 ⋅max�𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡+1𝑞𝑞 , 0� + 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 ⋅ max�𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡+1𝑟𝑟 , 0�,  (13) 
                                                          
and a volatility of 1.04%. The correlation between the log-returns of stocks and the bond yields 
is -0.47. Annual inflation is set to 1.6%.5 
For calibrating the CBD mortality model, we rely on data provided by the Human 
Mortality Database (www.mortality.org). Specifically, we use mortality data for German males 
age 65 – 109 over the period 1956 through 2011, the last date currently available. Based on 
OLS estimation, we set the drift of 𝐴𝐴1 (𝐴𝐴2) to – 0.0374 (0.0003), the volatility of 𝐴𝐴1 (𝐴𝐴2) to 0.0878 (0.0012), and the correlation between 𝐴𝐴1 and 𝐴𝐴2 to −0.9443. We set the initial values 
for 𝐴𝐴1 (𝐴𝐴2) at 𝑡𝑡 = 0 to −11.2006 (0.1060), projecting the values from the 2011 HMD dataset 
2 years into the future. Furthermore, we assume that mortality and capital market shocks are 
uncorrelated.  
First-order mortality assumptions for pricing the PLAs draw on annuitant mortality data 
provided by the German Association of Actuaries (DAV). Specifically, we use the “DAV 2004 
R” table for males, incorporating their first-order trend to generate the cohort table for those 
age 65 in 2013. The guaranteed interest rate used in PLA pricing is set to 60% of the average 
yield on 10-year government bonds, which is the maximum return guarantee allowed under 
German insurance regulation (see, among others, Berdin/Gründl, 2014). Consequently, given 
our capital market parameterization, the 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 is set to 3.5% for the baseline calibration, and to 
2.3% in the adverse capital market environment scenario. Due to the ongoing low-interest 
environment, actual 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 for German PLAs currently stand at 1.75% and are scheduled to 
decrease to 1.25% starting January 2015. To account for this continuing reduction in guarantee 
levels, we will also study a scenario with zero 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃. In line with industry averages, the shares 
5 More recently, yields on German government bonds have declined even further, resulting in substantial 
difficulties for insurers that previously sold policies with generous, irrevocable, lifelong return guarantees. These 
insurers currently struggle to find adequate new investment opportunities that generate returns sufficient to cover 
those guarantees with limited exposure to capital market risks. Despite these developments, we refrain from 
narrowing down our calibration period to the most recent years, as the unprecedented decline in yields was 
accompanied by substantial stock price increases. It is most likely that these capital market developments cannot 
be sustained over a time period that corresponds with our long-term projection horizon. 
                                                          
of mortality and investment surplus attributed to the annuitant are set to 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 92%, the 
fraction of insurer reserves invested in equities is set to 10%, and the expense loading factor is 
set to 𝛿𝛿 = 6.6% (see Maurer et al., 2013a). 
To derive the optimal policies for consumption, investment, and annuitization, we follow 
the standard approach and first normalize our optimization problem by the (exogenous) 
retirement income, in order to reduce the computational burden. Then, we employ backward 
induction through the five-dimensional state space {W, L, A1, A2, t}, relying on Gaussian 
quadrature integration when calculating the expected future indirect utility. Subsequently, we 
evaluate the resulting optimal controls by simulating 100,000 independent lifecycles for a male 
age 65 in 2013, whose accumulated retirement nest-egg in the form of liquid wealth amounts 
to four times his retirement income, the average wealth to income ratio for individuals age 60 
to 70 in the 2010 wave of the German SAVE panel survey. 
3 Results 
3.1 Base Case 
We begin our study with an analysis of the retiree’s optimal consumption, investment, 
and annuitization patterns under systematic longevity risk and our baseline capital market 
calibration. Figure 1 presents the expected development of total income (i.e. Social Security 
and guaranteed PLA income), periodic annuity purchases, annuitized wealth, liquid wealth, and 
inflation-adjusted consumption as well as the development of the allocation of total wealth to 
our three asset classes stocks, bonds, and (participating life) annuities over time. We illustrate 
these parameters for two different surplus distribution schemes. On the left, Panel A shows the 
results under the assumption that PLA surpluses are paid as life annuities, i.e. surpluses increase 
the amount of guaranteed lifelong income. On the right, Panel B shows the results under the 
alternative assumption that PLA surpluses are paid out immediately as lump sums.  
Figure 1 here 
We first turn to Panel A of Figure 1. At age 65, the beginning of the retirement phase, the 
individual shifts a substantial fraction of his financial means into the annuity product. PLA 
purchases amount to 1.94 times the pension income, roughly 39% of initial cash on hand. The 
retiree decides to consume about 1.07 times the pension income and the remaining funds of 
1.99 times the pension income are held in liquid asset, primarily stocks. The resulting asset 
allocation is 50% stocks, 2% bonds, and 48% PLAs, where the value of PLA holdings is 
calculated as the amount of guaranteed lifelong annuity income times the age-specific annuity 
factor. 
In subsequent periods, the retiree continues to steadily annuitize. Yet the level of 
additional PLA purchases drops measurably, ranging between 0.3 and 0.4 times the pension 
income until the mid 90s and then gradually decreasing toward the end of the lifecycle. Small 
purchases of additional PLAs suffice, because all surpluses earned on PLA holdings are also 
annuitized, resulting in both increasing annuity wealth as well as annuity income. Annuity 
wealth peaks in the early 90s at around 8.3 times the pension income and then drops to zero as 
the individual reaches the end of the lifecycle. 
With total income increasing measurably due to continued annuitization, the retiree is not 
only able to maintain his consumption level but can even increase it in real terms. Over the 
whole retirement period, inflation-adjusted consumption almost triples from the initial 1.07 to 
3.13 at age 100. 
Despite the increase in consumption, liquid wealth holdings remain almost constant 
during the first decade in retirement, and only from age 75 we see a measurable drawdown that 
continues until the end of the lifecycle. While the overall share of liquid wealth decreases with 
increasing annuity wealth, the bond share remains fairly constant at around 2% until age 75, 
which leads to marginal de-risking of liquid wealth. Subsequently, however, bonds are 
gradually crowded out of the portfolio until the late 80s.  
Next, we turn to Panel B of Figure 1 that presents optimal household behavior when PLA 
surpluses are paid out as lump sums. As in the previous setup, the retiree spends a substantial 
amount of his financial means on PLA purchases at age 65. With 1.87 times his pension income, 
this number initially falls slightly short of that in the case of surplus annuitization. 
Subsequently, however, annual PLA purchases constantly amount to around 0.5 times the 
pension income, 60% above those in the previous case. Higher PLA purchases come as no 
surprise, as annuity income no-longer increases automatically when PLAs generate surpluses. 
Moreover, while surplus annuitization is free of administrative charges, the retiree here has to 
pay expense loadings for every increase in annuity income. Nonetheless, the allocation of funds 
to PLA purchases is high enough to overcompensate both the lack of surplus annuitization and 
the higher administrative charges. Consequently, annuitized wealth as well as total income are 
higher than in the case of surplus annuitization until the early 80s. Subsequently, however, 
neither annuitized wealth nor income can keep up with their counterparts in the first setup. 
Annuity wealth peaks at 7.13 times the pension income around age 90. The same holds for 
income, which is down by about 25% at the end of the lifecycle. 
The higher PLA purchases early in retirement are in no small part financed by 
withdrawals from liquid wealth. By age 75, already around 50% of initial liquid wealth has 
been spent, and around age 90, liquid wealth has been depleted. This also has implications for 
the asset allocation. While initially 48% of the retiree’s wealth is invested in stocks, 6% in 
bonds, and 46% in PLAs, bonds are quickly crowded out by PLAs. At age 70, the individual 
already holds 76% of his wealth in PLAs and 24% in stocks. PLAs exhibit bond-like 
characteristics, and since –in this case– some of their returns are distributed in the form of liquid 
lump sums, there is no need for holding liquid bonds. 
Over the first couple of periods, average consumption exceeds that in the surplus 
annuitization scenario by about 2%. Subsequently, higher PLA prices take their toll on 
consumption opportunities, which increasingly fall short of those in the previous case. By age 
90, the gap in average annual inflation-adjusted consumption has risen to 3.5% and continues 
to increase to about 22% until the end of the lifecycle. 
3.2 Impact of Systematic Mortality Risk 
In the context of our model, mortality rates and their potential uncertainty influence the 
retiree’s optimal portfolio choice and annuitization decisions via two competing channels. First, 
they have an immediate impact on the subjective discount rates in the individual’s intertemporal 
utility function, as described in Equation 3. The higher (lower) the retiree’s mortality rates, the 
lower (higher) the appeal of prospective future consumption and, hence, the lower (higher) the 
appetite for the lifelong income stream from PLAs. On the other hand, higher (lower) mortality 
rates have a positive (negative) impact on the level of cash flows provided by the PLAs through 
the mortality surplus mechanism discussed in Section 2.3. These cash flows, however, are 
conditional on being alive at the time of payment. The impact of mortality rate stochasticity on 
the trade-off between these two opposing effects and the resulting implications for PLA demand 
are not obvious. This section aims at shedding more light on this issue. 
Figure 2 first provides a deeper insight into the implications of systematic mortality risk 
on the surplus mechanism within our PLA setup and given the German mortality data we 
calibrated the model to. The figure depicts the differences between actual mortality rates (𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡) 
and the first-order mortality assumptions (𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼) over time. As described in Equation 10, these 
differences are the central determining factor for the mortality surpluses generated within the 
PLA. Figure 2 presents these quantities for two alternative mortality dynamics. First, the solid 
black line shows the values under a trend-only mortality regime, which assumes that the 
evolution of mortality rates is deterministic. Specifically, we assume that mortality rates follow 
the process described in Section 2.2, but with the shocks 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 in Equation 7 equal to zero. Second, 
the blue fan chart depicts the distribution of the differences in mortality rates from our baseline 
model with stochastic mortality (5% to 95% quantile based on 100,000 simulation runs, with 
darker areas having higher probability mass). In case the difference is positive, actual mortality 
rates (𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡) exceed the rates assumed when pricing the PLA (𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼). 
Figure 2 here 
With trending mortality, actual mortality (𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡) always exceed assumed mortality (𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼), and 
the PLA continuously generates mortality surpluses. Small early in retirement (about 0.5% at 
age 65), the difference in mortality rates gradually increases to around 1.2% at age 80. Under 
the surplus annuitization scheme and given our mortality surplus participation rate (𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞) of 92%, 
this difference translates into an increase in lifelong annuity income of about 1.1% in that 
particular year. Subsequently, the gap in mortality rates decreases until they are almost equal at 
age 90, before it steeply increases to about 5% at the end of the lifecycle. 
Under stochastic mortality, the general pattern of the differences in mortalities is of course 
preserved, as mortality rates randomly fluctuate around said trend with volatilities increasing 
with time horizon. Throughout the first decade and a half in retirement, dispersion of mortality 
rate differences is moderate. Hence, by age 80, surplus-generating mortality rate differences 
still exceed 0.5% for 95% of all mortality developments. Subsequently, however, the range of 
possible outcomes widens sharply. Around age 84, the fan chart intersects with the zero line, 
indicating that 5% of simulated mortality developments result in negative mortality rate 
differences and in PLAs producing mortality losses. By age 90, PLAs generate negative 
surpluses in almost 50% of the simulation runs, a number that drops to around 22% until the 
end of the lifecycle. Due to the guarantees embedded in PLAs, these mortality losses are borne 
by the insurer (see Equation 13).6 Hence, should mortality rates decrease substantially, the 
6 From the perspective of the insurer, the probability of negative mortality surpluses at advanced ages of the 
annuitant is substantial. By that age, however, the remaining actuarial reserve is already comparably small. As 
the absolute pecuniary loss suffered by the insurer depends on both the mortality rate difference as well as the 
actuarial reserve, the insurer may well be able to sustain them. 
                                                          
retiree can enjoy the longer lifetime while still receiving at least the guaranteed minimum 
annuity income. On the other end of the distribution, 50% of simulation runs produce mortality 
rate differences exceeding 4% toward the end of the lifecycle, and in the 5% cases with highest 
mortality rates, differences even top 13%. Hence, in case of survival, substantial mortality 
credits can be expected.  
Next, we turn to Figure 3, which shows the impact of stochastic mortality rates on the 
distribution of PLA purchases over time. Again, Panel A on the left depicts the results for the 
surplus annuitization scheme, while Panel B on the right presents the surplus lump sum case. 
At the top of each panel, we present the distribution of annuity purchases under stochastic 
mortality, while the results under trending mortality regime are shown at the bottom. As in 
Figure 2, the fan charts depicted here describe the 5%:95% range of the purchase distribution, 
with darker areas representing higher probability mass.  
Under the surplus annuitization scheme, early in retirement, the stochastic mortality 
scenario produces a PLA purchase distribution that is comparable to that in the trending 
mortality scenario. In both cases, the differences in PLA purchases between the 5% and the 
95% quantile amount to between 0.4 and 0.5 times the pension income over the first 15 years 
in retirement. The distribution under trending mortality, however, is shifted upward by an 
average 0.04 times the pension income, indicating that PLAs are marginally more sought after 
than under stochastic mortality. Yet in that phase of the lifecycle, stochasticity in mortality rates 
has negligible impact on demand, which corresponds to our insights from Figure 2 earlier in 
this section. Consequently, early in retirement, differences in PLA purchases across simulated 
lifecycles must primarily be driven by other stochastic factors, namely capital market 
developments. 
Figure 3 here 
At advanced ages, this picture changes dramatically. Under trending mortality, from age 
90, the purchase distribution collapses to an almost deterministic pattern, with differences in 
PLA purchases between the 5% and the 95% quantile amounting to a mere 0.07 times the 
pension income, on average. By contrast, stochastic mortality rates trigger differentiated 
annuitization patterns. While the range of PLA purchases is smaller than early in retirement, 
the difference between the 5% and the 95% quantile still averages 0.36 times the pension 
income. 
The surplus lump sum scenario in Panel B of Figure 3 exhibits a comparable pattern. Yet, 
the range of PLA purchases is wider than under surplus annuitization, both earlier as well as 
later in the lifecycle. Without automatic annuitization of surpluses, deliberate PLA purchases 
more strongly depend on the development of PLA surpluses and, hence, on the stochastic 
development of the mortality rates. 
3.3 Impact of Adverse Capital Market Environments 
Having discussed how mortality developments influence the performance of PLAs and 
their attractiveness to retirees in the previous section, we now turn to the second driver of PLA 
benefits: the capital market. In particular, we will discuss how the retiree adjusts annuitization 
and asset allocation patterns over the lifecycle if capital markets generate less generous returns 
than in our baseline calibration. Against this background, we will study the appeal of PLAs 
under two alternative product specifications. In the first setup, the 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 will again be set to 60% 
of the average bond yield, and the share of surplus attributed to the annuitant will again be set 
to the market average of 92%. In the second setup, we assume that the insurer reacts to the 
adverse developments in the capital markets by reducing the generosity of the PLA. 
Specifically, we assume that guarantees are cut by setting the 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 equal to zero. In addition to 
that, we assume that the insurer reduces surplus attributions to the annuitant to the minimum 
currently stipulated by the German regulator. The minimum share for asset surpluses (𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟) is 
90%, while that for mortality surpluses (𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞) is 50%. Table 1 presents the resulting expected 
developments of total income, PLA purchases, annuity wealth, liquid wealth, and inflation-
adjusted consumption at selected ages for both the surplus annuitization scheme as well as the 
surplus lump sum scheme. Panel A summarizes our findings for the baseline capital market 
calibration, as discussed in Section 3.1. Panels B and C present the results under the alternative 
calibration for the two PLA specifications. The corresponding Table 2 presents the expected 
developments of the asset allocation. 
Table 1 here 
As one would expect, the adverse capital market environment leaves the retiree worse off 
than under the baseline regime. Comparing Panels A and B in Table 1, both income and total 
wealth (annuitized plus liquid) in the crisis setup fall short of their counterparts under the more 
favorable calibration. This also holds for inflation-adjusted consumption, despite the fact that 
annual inflation is 0.6% below baseline inflation, i.e. more than one quarter. The reduced 
prospects of earning excess returns in the stock market reduce the opportunity costs of 
annuitization, and the retiree draws down liquid assets more quickly. By contrast, PLA 
purchases under the surplus annuitization scheme initially increase by 26% and subsequently 
remain at the baseline level, despite the reduced means available. Still, PLA income and wealth 
cannot keep up with the baseline values as lower capital market returns imply less asset 
surpluses. Results are comparable under the surplus lump sum setup, where initial PLA 
purchases increase by even 60%. Subsequently, however, investments in additional annuities 
fall short of those in the base case by about 15%, on average.  
The change in return prospects and annuitization patterns has substantial impact on the 
retiree’s asset allocation, particularly early in retirement. As shown in Table 2, initial equity 
allocations drop from around 50% to less than 5% under both the surplus annuitization as well 
as the surplus lump sum regime, and a few years into retirement, stock holdings are negligible. 
By contrast, the initial allocation to PLAs increases from 48% to 61% under surplus 
annuitization, and from 46% to over 75% under the surplus lump sum scheme. Subsequently, 
PLA allocations remain high and in excess of the baseline levels. As stocks become less 
desirable, the appeal of bonds increases. This particularly holds under surplus annuitization, as 
in this case bonds are the only alternative to stocks that also provides some liquidity and 
flexibility. While marginal in the base case, bond allocations now average about 36%, initially, 
and remain at a measurable level well into retirement. Results under surplus distribution via 
lump sums are comparable, yet less pronounced, as the annual lump sums reduce the need for 
flexibility from liquid assets. 
Table 2 here 
Now, we turn to the case where the insurer reduces both the 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 as well as the surplus 
attribution in reaction to the adverse capital market environment (Panel C in Tables 1 and 2). 
Cutting 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 to zero drives up PLA prices due to the lack of discounting (as per Equation 9). 
Consequently, a given premium payment buys less guaranteed income. At the same time, this 
cut increases the likelihood of generating positive asset surpluses as well as their level (as per 
Equation 11). Depending on the surplus distribution mechanism, these two effects have 
different impact on the retiree. 
Under the surplus lump sum scheme, the increase in asset surplus potential has an 
immediate positive impact on the annuitant, while he is free to choose whether to purchase 
additional (more expensive) PLAs. Hence, PLAs are still attractive for the retiree. He increases 
initial PLA purchases from 2.99 times the pension income in Panel B to 3.33, here. 
Consequently, he receives an initial guaranteed income of about 85% of that in the non-zero 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 case, despite the increase in PLA prices. Yet subsequent expenditure on new annuities is 
essentially equal to that in Panel B, which results in an increasing income gap due to the PLA 
price difference. In terms of overall asset allocation, the initial increase in PLA purchases drives 
up the portfolio share of annuities by almost nine percentage points to around 84% at retirement. 
This increase primarily comes out of bonds, due to the bond-like nature of PLAs, whereas the 
equity share is almost unchanged. Later in retirement, the impact of the initial purchase 
diminishes, and the allocation is comparable to that in Panel B.  
Under the surplus annuitization scheme, the initial attractiveness of PLAs is reduced, due 
to higher annuity premiums and the lack of compensatory immediate access to the potentially 
higher asset surplus. Initial PLA purchases drop from 2.44 times the pension income in Panel 
B to only 0.96. Given this reduction in expenditure and the increase in PLA prices, the initial 
guaranteed income is only about 30% that in the non-zero 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 case. Accordingly, the asset 
allocation is substantially shifted away from annuities. While in Panel B the initial PLA share 
was more than 60%, it now averages around only 23%. Two-thirds of the retiree’s assets are 
initially invested in bonds, compared to about one-third in Panel B, with the remaining 10% 
being held in stocks. As in the surplus lump sum scenario, PLA purchases and allocations 
converge to the respective values in Panel B later in retirement when the annuity becomes more 
attractive due to the survival credit. However, neither the annuity income nor inflation-adjusted 
consumption can catch up with their counterparts in Panel B, leaving the individual worse off 
than before. 
Some of the reduced attractiveness of PLAs in the last scenario of course has to be 
attributed to the reduced generosity of surplus attribution to the annuitant. Most of this reduction 
affected the mortality surplus, which was cut by almost 50%, whereas the reduction in asset 
surplus attribution was negligible. From our analysis in Section 3.2, however, we know that for 
most of the lifecycle mortality surpluses are comparably small, on average. They only gain 
substantial impact very late in life and in the tails of the mortality distribution. Hence, 
reductions related to the decrease in 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 dominate the effects of the changes with respect to the 
mortality surplus. 
3.4 Welfare Implications 
Finally, we seek to appraise the utility that the retiree can draw from having access to 
PLAs. To this end, we perform a welfare analysis, employing the approach described in Horneff 
et al. (2009) and Horneff et al. (2013). We equate the retiree’s expected total utilities from a 
setup with and without access to PLAs by adjusting his initial wealth. In doing so, we can assign 
a monetary value to the difference in utilities. The results are shown in Table 3, which presents 
the fractions of initial wealth the retiree would be willing to forego in exchange for getting 
access to the PLA. 
Table 3 here 
When PLA surpluses are annuitized, the retiree in our baseline scenario with stochastic 
mortality values PLA access at about 20.5% of his initial endowment. In the more predictable 
scenario with deterministically trending mortality, this number increases by about 3%. Hence, 
utility losses from exposure to systematic mortality risk and the resulting PLA benefit volatility 
are only moderate. Given the guarantees embedded and the lack of desirable investment 
alternatives, PLAs also prove to be valuable in times of capital market turmoil. Given our 
parameterization, the retiree would be willing to trade one-quarter of his wealth for the 
opportunity to annuitize. This, of course, only holds as long as the provider does not have to 
reduce the generosity of the product. But even if the guaranteed interest rate was cut to zero and 
surplus attributions were reduced to the regulatory minimum, PLAs provide ample utility gains 
in the amount of almost 18% of initial wealth. 
In line with findings reported in Maurer et al. (2013a), PLAs provide even higher utility 
gains under the surplus lump sum regime: 27.4% in our base case and almost one-third in the 
adverse capital market environment. This result may appear surprising at first, given that 
periodically changing surpluses induce PLA payout volatility. Due to the lump sum payments, 
however, the annuitant receives benefits earlier. Not only does surplus annuitization delay 
payouts, it also results in strongly increasing benefit levels and dispersions late in life, making 
it difficult to smooth consumption over the lifecycle. Intriguingly, under the surplus lump sum 
scheme, the PLA even generates high levels of utility (27.6%) when the interest guarantee is 
reduced. This is related to the increased potential for surplus generation, as already discussed 
in the previous section. 
4 Conclusion 
We study optimal consumption, asset allocation, and annuitization patterns for a retired 
individual that has access to participating payout life annuities (PLAs), while facing capital 
market risks as well as idiosyncratic and systematic longevity risks. PLAs provide guaranteed 
lifelong minimum annuity benefits and the opportunity to participate in surpluses from the 
insurer’s capital market and mortality experience. 
We find that it is optimal to shift a substantial fraction of available financial resources, 
almost 50%, into the PLA already right at retirement. This is driven by the possibility to 
participate in positive investment returns while being protected to some extent against adverse 
capital market developments by the minimum benefits guaranteed in the PLA. Subsequently, 
gradual annuitization continues until the end of the lifecycle. PLAs are highly valuable for the 
retiree, who is willing to give up more than 20% of initial wealth to get access to the annuity 
product. 
We also find that stochasticity in mortality rates only has a minor impact on the appeal of 
PLAs to the retiree. Given the fact that period-to-period changes of mortality rate are minuscule, 
systematic longevity risk only has a long-term impact on PLA purchases. Consequently, in the 
absence of stochastic mortality, the retiree’s willingness to pay for access to PLA markets only 
increases by 3% of initial wealth. 
It is intuitively clear that the annuity product is more valuable in adverse capital market 
environments, due to the guarantees embedded in the PLA contract. This, however, relies on 
the premise that the insurer will continue to be able to pay the guaranteed benefits – a 
questionable assumption given current developments in the capital markets. A possible 
approach to react to the current situation is to reduce guaranteed interest rates to zero. Our 
results indicate that such a policy would only have a minor negative impact on the attractiveness 
of the product, particularly in a situation of increased capital market risks.  
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Figure 1: Expected Lifecycle Profiles – Baseline Calibration 
 Panel A: Surplus Annuitization Panel B: Surplus Lump Sum 
  
  
Notes: Male retiree age 65. Stochastic mortality. Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean 8.89% (5.91%), volatility: 
25.3% (2.1%). Annual inflation: 2.2%. PLA pricing assumptions: Mortality: DAV 2004 R (year 2013) plus trend, 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 3.5%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92. 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92.. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Figure 2: Differences between First- and Second-Order Mortality Rates over Time 
 
Notes: Simulated distributions of age-specific differences between actual mortality rate  𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡 from CBD model and 
first-order mortality rate 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼 from DAV 2004 R plus trend. Fan chart: 5%-95% quantile range of the difference 
distribution with darker areas representing higher probability mass. Solid black line: difference in trending 
mortality scenario. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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 Figure 3: Distributional Implications of Stochastic Mortality on PLA Purchases 
 Panel A: Surplus Annuitization Panel B: Surplus Lump Sum 
 
 
Notes: 5%-95% quantile range of simulated periodic PLA purchases with darker areas representing higher 
probability mass. Male retiree age 65. Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean: 8.89% (5.91%), volatility: 25.3% 
(2.1%). Annual inflation: 2.2%. PLA pricing assumptions: Mortality: DAV 2004 R (year 2013) plus trend, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 =3.5%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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 Table 1: Expected Lifecycle Profiles – Alternative Calibrations 
  Surplus Annuitization   Surplus Lump Sum 
 Age  Age 
 65 75 85 95  65 75 85 95 
A: Baseline Capital Market Calibration (1980 – 2012) 
Total Income 1.00 1.47 2.23 4.13  1.00 1.51 2.16 3.43 
Annuity Purchases 1.94 0.29 0.36 0.31  1.87 0.51 0.54 0.54 
Annuity Wealth 1.82 4.92 7.25 8.23  1.76 5.53 6.98 6.67 
Liquid Wealth 1.99 1.83 0.88 0.21  2.04 1.03 0.50 0.02 
Consumption (real) 1.08 1.15 1.34 1.92  1.09 1.13 1.33 1.72 
          
B: Crisis Capital Market Calibration (2000 – 2012) 
Total Income 1.00 1.45 2.04 3.50  1.00 1.49 2.00 3.07 
Annuity Purchases 2.44 0.28 0.35 0.32  2.99 0.43 0.46 0.48 
Annuity Wealth 2.29 5.07 6.51 6.83  2.81 5.73 6.40 5.88 
Liquid Wealth 1.50 0.90 0.51 0.17  0.93 0.49 0.33 0.01 
Consumption (real) 1.07 1.01 1.26 1.91  1.08 1.05 1.31 1.79 
          
C: Crisis Capital Market Calibration (2000 – 2012), GIR = 0, Minimum Surplus Distribution 
Total Income 1.00 1.29 1.79 3.15  1.00 1.39 1.85 2.87 
Annuity Purchases 0.96 0.24 0.30 0.28  3.33 0.48 0.48 0.50 
Annuity Wealth 0.90 3.96 5.59 6.21  3.13 5.57 6.17 5.66 
Liquid Wealth 2.98 1.27 0.59 0.21  0.61 0.51 0.34 0.01 
Consumption (real) 1.06 0.98 1.13 1.73   1.07 1.01 1.24 1.70 
Notes: Male retiree age 65. Stochastic mortality. Panel A: Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean: 8.89% (5.91%), 
volatility: 25.3% (2.1%). Annual inflation: 2.2%. PLA pricing assumptions: Mortality: DAV 2004 R (year 2013) 
plus trend, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 3.5%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92. Panel B: Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean: 0.7% (3.86%), 
volatility: 30.0% (1.04%). Annual inflation: 1.6%. PLA pricing assumptions: Mortality: DAV 2004 R (year 2013) 
plus trend, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 2.3%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92. Panel C: as in B with 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 0%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.90, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.5. Source: 
Authors’ calculation. 
 
  
 Table 2: Expected Asset Allocations – Alternative Calibrations 
  Surplus Annuitization   Surplus Lump Sum 
 Age  Age 
 65 75 85 95  65 75 85 95 
A: Baseline Capital Market Calibration (1980 – 2012) 
Stocks 50.0 24.9 10.8 2.5  47.7 15.8 6.7 0.3 
Bonds 2.2 2.2 0.1 0.0  6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Annuities 47.8 72.8 89.1 97.5  46.4 84.2 93.3 99.7 
          
B: Crisis Capital Market Calibration (2000 – 2012) 
Stocks 3.7 1.3 0.3 0.7  4.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Bonds 35.8 13.8 7.0 1.8  20.7 7.6 4.9 0.2 
Annuities 60.5 84.9 92.7 97.5  75.1 92.1 95.1 99.8 
          
C: Crisis Capital Market Calibration (2000 – 2012), GIR = 0, Minimum Surplus 
Distribution 
Stocks 9.9 1.9 0.3 0.6  4.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Bonds 66.9 22.4 9.4 2.7  11.4 8.3 5.2 0.1 
Annuities 23.2 75.7 90.3 96.7   83.7 91.6 94.8 99.9 
Notes: Male retiree age 65. Stochastic mortality. Panel A: Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean: 8.89% (5.91%), 
volatility: 25.3% (2.1%). Annual inflation: 2.2%. PLA pricing assumptions: Mortality: DAV 2004 R (year 2013) 
plus trend, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 3.5%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92. Panel B: Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean: 0.7% (3.86%), 
volatility: 30.0% (1.04%). Annual inflation: 1.6%. PLA pricing assumptions: Mortality: DAV 2004 R (year 2013) 
plus trend, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 2.3%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92. Panel C: as in B with 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 0%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.90, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.5. Source: 
Authors’ calculation. 
 
Table 3: Welfare Analysis 
  Surplus Annuitization   Surplus Lump Sum 
    
A: Baseline Capital Market Calibration (1980 – 2012) 
Base Case 20.5  27.4 
Trending Mortality 23.5  28.0 
    
B: Crisis Capital Market Calibration (2000 – 2012) 
PLA: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 2.3%; 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92; 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92 24.0  32.7 
PLA: 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 0%; 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.5; 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.9 17.7  27.6 
Notes: Male retiree age 65. Stochastic mortality. Panel A: Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean: 8.89% (5.91%), 
volatility: 25.3% (2.1%). Annual inflation: 2.2%. PLA pricing assumptions: Mortality: DAV 2004 R (year 2013) 
plus trend, 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃 = 3.5%, 𝜔𝜔𝑟𝑟 = 0.92, 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 0.92. Panel B: Log-return stocks (bond yield): mean: 0.7% (3.86%), 
volatility: 30.0% (1.04%). Annual inflation: 1.6%. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
